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Introduction
It has become something of a truism that the Ôstandard accountÕ of representative democracy has now been Ôstretched to breaking pointÕ (Urbinati and Warren, 2008, p. 390) . There is broad acknowledgement that Ôpractices of democratic representation increasingly go beyond electoral venuesÕ, and this has led to the Ômost remarkable development [of] the proliferation of representative claims that cannot be tested by electionÕ (ibid., p. 403) . In response, a Ônew frontierÕ of democratic theory has been opened up beyond Ôa purely electoral rendering of democracy and representationÕ (ibid., p. 402) . A particularly prominent role in staking out the boundaries of this new theoretical frontier has been played by Saward (2006 Saward ( , 2010 in prospecting the notion of Ôthe representative claimÕ. Saward (2010, p. 140) starts from the premise that one of the Ômost critical key assumptions over four decadesÕ has been that Ôrepresentative democracy is all about elections, and only elected officials can be classed as democratic representativesÕ. In this sense Ôrepresentative democracy as a political system in which elected officials make collective decisions for constituents is too familiarÕ, and what is needed, therefore, is to Ômake democracy strange againÕ (ibid., p. 167). The strangeness is to be found, for Saward, in non-electoral forms of representation. In essence, Ôpolitical representation is a world of claim-making rather than the operation of formal institutionsÕ (ibid., p. 43). In which case it is difficult to sustain Ôa binary distinction between democratic representation based on election, on the one hand, and other-than-democratic representation based on a different mode of selection, on the otherÕ (ibid., p. 25).
In making the case that political representation is a process of claim-making rather than a fact established by institutional election or selection, Saward seeks to map out new theoretical territory and to blur the distinction between electoral and non-electoral representation. This article aims to prospect the contours of this map, and uses SawardÕs (2010, p. 1) dictum Ð that Ôpolitical ideas and practices are more closely intertwined than we often thinkÕ Ð as a compass to examine both the theory and practice of political representation in the United Kingdom. The specific example of non-electoral claims articulated through Ôthe word from the streetÕ Ð Ôbased on massive and tangible demonstration of popular supportÕ by protestors and demonstrators Ð is used to illustrate: first, the processes of making, constituting, evaluating and accepting claims for and by constituencies and audiences; and second, the continuing distinctiveness of claims based on electoral representation. Two basic questions structure the analysis. These reformulate the questions posed initially by Beetham (2003) The discussion is advanced in three stages: first, the notions of Ôrepresentative claimÕ and Ônon-electoral representationÕ are outlined; second, the distinction to be drawn between electoral and nonelectoral representative claims is clarified; and third, the utility of such new perspectives in understanding the practice of UK representative processes is assessed. SawardÕs list of limitations is derived from a detailed critique of the work of influential contemporary theorists, most particularly Pitkin (1967) , Mansbridge (2003) and Rehfeld (2006) . The scope of this critique extends beyond the immediate concerns of this article, but the main divergences between Saward and the other named theorists stem from his desire to move beyond PitkinÕs (1967, p. 209) notion of Ôsubstantive acting for othersÕ, with its implicit unidirectional relationship between representative and represented, and its emphasis on the identity of the former rather than the latter (Saward, 2010, p. 16) , towards a meaning that includes Ôdeeper processes of constructing the represented or that which needs to be representedÕ (ibid., p. 10 emphasis in original). Similarly, he wishes to build upon MansbridgeÕs categorisation of representation Ð promissory, anticipatory, gyroscopic and surrogate Ð to argue that representation Ôneed not be based on election in order to be representationÕ, or need not be formal (ibid., p. 22). Equally, he identifies RehfeldÕs (2006, p. 5) notion of an ÔaudienceÕ (as Ôthe relevant group of people who must recognise a claimant as a representativeÕ), as a way of understanding that political representation arises because a relevant audience accepts a representativeÕs claims in some way (Saward, 2010, p. 48) . Although Saward (2010, pp. 32Ð34) concedes that Mansbridge and Rehfeld (with others such as Phillips (1995) , Young (2000) , Goodin (2004) and Urbinati (2006) Saward (ibid. p. 109 ) calls for the recognition of the Ôinevitability, even the democratic necessity, of a wide array of other, nonelective representative claims in complex contemporary democratic politicsÕ. These include: group morality and ties of tradition; Ôpermanent interestsÕ articulated by senior bureaucrats; specialist expertise, surrogacy for wider interests; descriptive similarity as in ÔmirroringÕ; stakeholding; self-representation of the interests of, for example, future generations or non-human life; and the particular focus of this article, a claim based on Ômassive and tangible demonstration of popular supportÕ Ð the word from the street (ibid., p. 99).
The essence of SawardÕs (ibid., p. 43) view is that Ôpolitical representation is a world of claim-making rather than the operation of formal institutionsÕ. Claim-making consists of five interconnecting dimensions: maker, subject, object, referent and audience. A ÔmakerÕ, either as an individual or a collective actor, constructs or makes claims; a ÔsubjectÕ is a signifier and stands for an object; a referent is an idea of the thing being represented; and an ÔaudienceÕ receives the claims made Ð and accepts, rejects or ignores them. Ultimately, claim-makers are attempting Ôto achieve acceptance and other effects through the conceptions of subject and object they constructÕ (ibid., p. 48).
Saward asks: what is a representative claim about? The answer is relatively clear: ÔRepresentative claims are invariably constitutive claims, they construct in some measure the groups they purport to address (audience) along with the groups they purport to speak for or about (constituency)Õ (ibid., p.
54
). Yet, Ôrepresentative claims can only work, or even exist, if audiences acknowledge them in some wayÕ (ibid., p. 48). In this sense, there is an affinity with UrbinatiÕs (2006, p. 6) view that Ôrepresentation is a comprehensive filtering, refining and mediating process of political will formation and expressionÕ.
Although Urbinati (2006, p. 42 ) is willing to associate political representation with the Ôpower to make decisionsÕ and that these decisions Ôare collective in the sense that they apply to all the members of the body politicÕ, Saward (2010, p. 138) insists that ÔAt the heart of political representation lies the making and receiving of representative claimsÕ. Thus, he avoids a direct answer to the question, let alone posing the question in the first instance: What is the purpose of making a representative claim? Ultimately, for Saward (2011, p. 80) , Ôpolitics is not so much the authoritative allocation of values as the contest over the sites, styles and bases of allocation, values and authorityÕ. This view, as will be examined below, is of some significance when assessing the representative claims of demonstrators and Ôthe word from the streetÕ.
Legitimacy, representation and democracy
When Saward (2010, p. 144) Having briefly sketched the main contours of non-electoral representation, and the claims-based approach of Saward to democratic legitimacy, it is now time to examine these notions in the specific context of the Ôword from the streetÕ in the United Kingdom.
Word from the Street: Making the Claim
In making the case that a representative claim can be based on a Ômassive and tangible demonstration of popular supportÕ, Saward (ibid., p. 99) cites the example of protests against the Iraq war. As he puts it:
[T]wo million people marching in a London demonstration against going to war against Iraq (without a second UN resolution) is a basis for representative claims for those leading or addressing such demonstrations to be representative of a significant swathe of public opinion. (Davis, 2011) . And to make the claim in its Initial Statement:
We are of all ethnicities, backgrounds, genders, generations, sexualities dis/abilities and faiths. ...
We stand together with occupations all over the world. ... We refuse to pay for the banksÕ crisis.
We do not accept the cuts as either necessary or inevitable. ... We demand an end to global tax injustice and our democracy representing corporations instead of the people. ( 
Evaluating claims
However, making a claim is only part of an Ôongoing, dynamic processÕ (ibid., p. 44) of representation.
A claim has to be evaluated by constituencies and audiences through Ôacceptance actsÕ (ibid., pp.
151Ð153), which entail some assessment of the legitimacy of the claims made, and which can prompt negative and positive evaluations. 
Deciding Claims: Representation, Legitimacy and Democracy
While anti-war and anti-capitalist demonstrators, along with others articulating Ôthe word from the streetsÕ, sought to construct, through their representative claims, wider constituencies within the public, and to appeal to wider audiences, through social networking and formal and informal media, their ultimate claim was to affect public policies (the outputs of the formal representative process) and to target an intended audience that was situated ultimately within the electoral representative process (no matter how indirectly that audience was approached).
The representative claims of anti-war and anti-capitalist demonstrators Ð in addition to making a positive claim to represent those opposed to war/capitalism Ð also contained the counter, negative claim that they: 
Distinctiveness of Electoral Representation
As a first stage to understanding the distinctiveness of electoral representation, there is a need to examine the systemic nature of political representation and to appreciate that the systemic character of democratic representation is a Ôcomplex, mixed bag of election, acceptance, acclamation and propositionÕ (Saward, 2010, p. 163) . This is a view to which Mansbridge (2011, p. 628) and Rehfeld (2011, p. 640 ) subscribe, with both agreeing that Ôrepresentation at its broadest is systematic, in the sense of involving many different parts interacting with one another in interesting and complex waysÕ (Rehfeld, 2011, p. 640) . Moreover, it is a view rooted in PitkinÕs (1967, p. 221) belief that Ôpolitical representation is primarily a public, institutionalised arrangement involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex ways of large-scale social arrangementsÕ. She argues that ÔWhat makes it representation is not any single action by any one participant, but the overall structure and functioning of the systemÕ (ibid.). In such a system, decision making, based on representative processes, has the capacity to resolve Ôthe conflicting claims of the parts, on the basis of the common interest in the welfare of the wholeÕ (ibid., p. 217). As a process of adjudicating among, and reconciling, conflicting claims, political representation, or more accurately representative government, requires the construction of some common interest. For Pitkin (ibid., p.
224), the representative system Ômust look after the public interest and be responsive to public opinion, except insofar as non-responsiveness can be justified in terms of the public interest. At both ends the process is public and institutionalÕ. The most important institutional feature of representative government is that Ôwithin a state, representation most commonly is ascribed to the legislatureÕ (ibid., p. 227). It is within statal representative assemblies that the Ônational interest is often formulated out of the rival claims of interests and localities within the stateÕ (ibid., p. 218).
However, where the recent discussion has moved on from PitkinÕs position is in the recognition of legitimate representative claims beyond the institutional configurations of elections and representative assemblies (Urbinati and Warren, 2008, p. 391 ). Yet, even Saward (2010, p. 167) acknowledges that his approach does not constitute a Ôblack-and-white alternativeÕ to conventional conceptions of electoral democracy, and that Ôelections and parliaments and the forms of due authorisation and accountability they offer still matter, of courseÕ. From reading Saward (ibid. passim), the reasons why elective forms of representation Ôstill matterÕ are to be found, variously, in: decisional roles; perceived legitimacy, their positioning in Ôa deep structure of more foundational or sedimentary representative claims of an institutional and (ultimately) constitutional sortÕ; symbolic representation of affectedness and unity where the legislature at state level Ôbrings the nation symbolically under one roofÕ; the extent and quality of public deliberation and Ôdeliberative accountability over timeÕ.
Decisional roles
If democracy is taken to mean a system that enables citizens to participate in the making of decisions that affect them, then it is a form of government (see Held, 2006, p. 1; Urbinati, 2011, p. 23 ). In the case of representative government, if the democratic claims of the system are to be sustained, periodic elections have to be free, with an equal weight assigned to each vote and open to all enfranchised citizens who must have the competence to freely organise, speak and inform themselves of the alternatives (Rowbottom, 2010, pp. 7Ð13; Alonso et al 2011, p. 6 ). Added to this, majority rule has to be limited by a respect for minority rights (Sartori, 1987, p. 30) . Moreover, elections bring conditionality to decision making. Elections implant uncertainty in the minds of representatives.
They Ôbecome periodic and dramatic demonstrations of the fact that possession of decision making power by representatives is contingent upon the continuing support of their electorateÕ (Judge, 1999, pp. 11Ð12).
Perceived legitimacy
The principle of equality encapsulated in voting and majority rule in the decision-making process produces, for Ôprocedural democratsÕ at least, results that Ôare legitimate because the procedure is fair, not because the results are rightÕ (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 26) . There are two main emphases underpinning such a procedural view: authorisation and accountability. On the one side, elections for Ôauthorisation theoristsÕ constitute a Ôgrant of authorityÕ by which representatives are deemed to have the authority to deliberate and decide for others (Pitkin, 1967, p. 43 ÔThe extent and quality of public deliberationÕ/Ôdeliberative accountability over timeÕ Saward (ibid., p. 109 ) is willing to contemplate that Ôthe primary democratic contribution of electionsÕ rests in their contribution to Ôthe extent and quality of public deliberationÕ. This capacity of elections to secure deliberation is privileged Ôover and above their role as the core medium of democracy or a key guarantor of genuine representationÕ. However, the deliberative contribution of electoral representation can be extended beyond periodic election campaigns to include the intervening periods between elections, and the quality of intra-institutional deliberation within representative assemblies. Certainly, functionalistoriented legislative scholars in the United Kingdom conceived of a deliberative role for the House of
Commons in terms of a Ôcontinuous electoral campaignÕ (Crick, 1968, p. 26 ; see also Norton, 1991, p. 63 ). In the realm of political theory, Mansbridge (2003, p. 525) has counselled that when judgements are made of Ôhow well a political system meets democratic normsÕ, some of the criteria should be Ôdeliberatively oriented and systemicÕ. However, what is distinctive about parliamentary deliberation is not simply a question of scale Ð of its macro-focus, rather than micro-focus Ð but its nature. Elected representatives in parliaments in modern representative democracies can be conceived as Ônot simply facilitators of collective decision-making. Their decisions are taken in the name of the collective, and on its behalfÕ (Runciman, 2007, p. 105 ). This point is echoed in Eriksen and FossumÕs (2011, p. 5) statement that: Similarly, Urbinati (2006, p. 134) maintains that Ôcitizens have to see and understand that they have something in common that unifies themÕ, and political representation in parliament provides a Ôunifying processÕ that enables sovereignty to be interpreted in terms of judgement and an imagined general will. Hence, for Urbinati (ibid., p. 59), any democratic theory of representation needs, Ôas the point of departureÕ, the Ôfictional worlds of beliefs and judgementÕ. More categorically, Rehfeld (2005, p. 149) stipulates: ÔThere is simply no plausible justification for establishing a national representative legislature without some reference to the resulting good of all, whatever the good may turn out to entailÕ. Therefore, a prime purpose of parliament is to subject the conception of the national interest held by political representatives to, what Manin (1997, p. 191) calls, Ôthe trial of discussionÕ. In this view, representative government is a system in which Ôeverything has to be justified in debateÕ.
Sidestepping here the protracted debate about the terminological differences between Ôthe national interestÕ, Ôthe public willÕ and Ôthe general willÕ, and how each is conceptualised and deployed in political theory; the important point for present purposes is that a national representative assembly is required to justify, through deliberation, the vision of the national interest propounded therein. In this respect, justification is a form of accountability or responsibility. What distinguishes electoral forms of representation, ultimately, is that Ôonly the elected have both deliberative and decision making powerÕ (Urbinati, 2006, p. 15) .
Electoral Claims and Collective Decisional Processes in the United Kingdom
From the preceding discussion, the distinctiveness of electoral representation has been identified as What is remarkable about the Iraq controversy is that parliamentary deliberation only came into play long after an intense debate had been conducted in all kinds of other public settings ... It would be difficult to argue that the level of these parliamentary debates was in any way superior to those that had already taken place in many other public settings.
What is distinctive about parliamentary debate, however, is not any supposed superior quality,6 but rather the institutionalised, judgemental nature of deliberation and the constant testing of the claim that decisions made by elected representatives (invariably, in practice, the decisions taken by government)
represent Ôthe national interestÕ. it is important for the protesters to realise that were we to accede to their demands, that would have one of three effects, without any doubt whatever: interest rates, and therefore peopleÕs mortgages, would go up, or there would be less scope for helping pensioners, or we would have to reduce spending on public services. We will do what we can, but we will not do anything that puts There are matters at stake that rise above party politics. It is the duty of the Government to act in the national interest, and it is the duty of the Opposition to support them when they do so. The
Prime Minister is acting in the national interest today. That is why he is entitled to our support in Perhaps not surprisingly, despite a basic consensus being shared by successive UK governments on a regulatory regime for the United KingdomÕs financial and banking sectors Ð framed so as not to inhibit the international competitive advantage of these sectors (see Gamble, 2009, p. 458 turns out that either of these is exactly the same as the national interestÕ. Therefore, in effect, the difference between non-electoral representation and electoral representation, and between claims based on sectional interest and general interest, is that the former is a claim for compatibility, or at best congruence, with a conception of Ôthe national interestÕ, whereas the latter is a claim of exact synonymity with Ôthe national interestÕ.
Conclusion
In essence, this article rephrased the fundamental questions raised by Beetham: Is it legitimate for a democratically elected government to ignore public opinion [as expressed through mass demonstrations and protests]? Is it democratic for it to do so? BeethamÕs own answers are unequivocally ÔnoÕ and ÔnoÕ. However, in rephrasing these questions Ð to focus on the nature of the representative claims made, the audiences addressed and the acceptance acts associated, respectively, with electoral and non-electoral representation Ð the answers are more equivocal.
In this rephrasing, non-electoral claims, based on Ômassive and tangible demonstration of popular supportÕ and the expression of the Ôword from the streetÕ, serve to Ôconstruct a constituencyÕ and address an audience beyond formal representative institutions and, in many instances, beyond the boundaries of the UK state. Undoubtedly, the Ôword from the streetÕ has its own claim to legitimacy. 
Notes
1 Although the discussion of representative claims is couched in universalistic terms, Saward (2010, p. 179 6 A feature of the theories of Burke and John Stuart Mill is a defence of the superior quality of deliberation in representative assemblies, see Judge (1999, pp. 47Ð57) .
7 This is Ôa claimÕ to represent Ôthe national interestÕ. Obviously, the concept of Ônational interestÕ is socially constructed and contestable. What is distinctive about the claim to represent, or the construction of, the Ônational interestÕ made by elected representatives, however, is that it is legitimated through the process of election and subjected to repeated testing in the Ôconstant electoral campaignÕ of institutionalised parliamentary deliberation. This does not mean that such constructions are objective, non-partisan or non-reflective of broader power differentials in economic and social relations. It simply means that these constructions are subject to electoral testing. Significantly, for this discussion, the Cabinet Office recently maintained that the basis of the post-2010 UK coalition government was Ôa shared assessment by the two parties forming the Government on where the national interest lay ... The Programme for Government ... represents the GovernmentÕs strategic assessment of the actions needed to secure the UKÕs national interestÕ (HC 1625 . In identifying six strategic aims to promote the national interest, the government maintained that these aims were Ôwidely shared across the UK political spectrumÕ. While recognising that there were significant party differences as to how these aims were to be translated into policies and implemented, Cabinet Office minister, Oliver Letwin, nonetheless, maintained that any governmentÕs conception of the strategic aims to be pursued in the national interest Ôhave been subject to a very considerable Ð in fact, the toughest Ð democratic test [at elections]Õ (HC 1625 (HC , 2012 . Indeed, recognition that Ôelected representatives are best placed to articulate an understandingÕ of how the national interest is conceived, the political limitations upon national strategy and Ôwhat the electorate will find acceptableÕ was highlighted by the House of CommonsÕ Public Administration Select Committee (HC 435, 2010, paras 46Ð47) . This was not an uncritical acceptance of the governmentÕs definition of the national interest or its specification of national strategic aims. Indeed, in the CommitteeÕs opinion, the governmentÕs statement of aims might have been Ôwell-meaning but [was] too meaningless to serve any useful purposeÕ (HC 1625 (HC , 2012 . The Committee also acknowledged that while Ôit is elected politicians and ministers that have the democratic legitimacyÕ (HC 435, 2010, para 47) to pursue their conception of the national interest, Ôelections are only a small part of the conversation on the fundamental questions which determine the future of the countryÕ (HC 1625 (HC , 2012 . The point made here is that within that conversation, elected politicians claim to have the authoritative and authentic voice and base that claim on their elected status.
8 Many protest social movements profoundly reject the concept of leadership, or for that matter, representation itself (see for example Occupy LSX, 2011b ).
